Introduction
We are going to ensure, like every solvent household in the country; that what we buy, we can afford; that the bills we incur, we have the income to meet; and that we do not saddle our children with the interest on the interest on the interest of the debts we were not ourselves prepared to pay.
George Osborne, 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review
The global recession of [2008] [2009] was caused by the collapse of the speculative housing market, global inflation as a result of new emerging markets for commodities, the overinflation of asset prices and other high-risk lending practices in the banking industry. Many economists have also linked the current recession to the cyclical boom-and-bust nature of late capitalism. In response to the recession, a variety of economic measures have been implemented on national and international levels in an attempt to encourage recovery, most taking the form of fiscal 'austerity'. 'Austerity', the quality or state of being austere and the condition of enforced economy, was named Word of the Year in 2010 by the MerriamWebster dictionary, and has since been attached to a raft of neoliberal economic policies which have been concerned with deficit reduction, reduced public spending and diminishing/disappearing welfare benefits and payments. 'Austerity' is also the central agenda under which the responsibilities of the state towards its citizens are being reconfigured, for example in new, tighter conditions being imposed on those receiving financial aid and assistance.
In the UK in 2009, David Cameron, then leader of the Conservative party in opposition, now Prime Minister, announced that Britain would move into an 'age of austerity', characterised by restraint, thrift and transparency in public spending, and here positioned as a necessary response to the national deficit and to the profligacy of the thenLabour administration (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) ). Cameron's speech referred to this previous Labour administration as 'spendaholics', 'irresponsible' and 'a party of extravagant waste', situating the cause of the crisis within public overspending and lack of fiscal restraint. In this speech, and in many others since, repeated distinctions are drawn between the out-of-control work (Corell and Barnard 2007) , and the broader gender pay gap whereby women are still paid 16.4 per cent less for full time work and 35 per cent less for part time work than men (again with mothers absorbing the bulk of this gender pay gap), these multiple impacts offer a bleak picture for women raising children. Despite the fact that they are hardest hit by the recession, some mothers are taking up the turn to 'austerity' in remarkably positive ways:
stationing their reduced income, greater precarity, unemployment or underemployment and uncertain futurity within broader projects to remake their family life, their domestic practices, their labour and consumer subjectivities, in order to become frugal, thrifty and austere parents.
I situate the current 'turn to austerity' not just within economic spheres, but also within the realm of the affective, examining how austerity positions us in ways which are at once social and psychic. This paper contributes to a growing field of work that attends to the psychosocial aspects of contemporary life and to the anxieties, fears and fantasies that are at play in the production of social identity and practices which attempt to consolidate and defend social privilege (Hollway and Jefferson 2000; Vincent and Ball 2006) . This field combines social science with theories of the interior and offers novel accounts of how social inequalities take shape psychically (Reay 2008) , how the social world is 'desirously and defensively' appropriated (Hollway 2004 ) and how value systems are consciously and unconsciously reproduced and circulated, attaching moral worth to specific lives and subjects through the pathologising of others (Sayer 2005; Skeggs 1997 Skeggs , 2004 Haylett 2001 ).
This paper asks what affective incitements are circulating around austerity, gender, family and the future: what are the romances of austerity, and specifically of austerity parenting, and how is austerity being incorporated into a longer rewriting of the affective components of citizenship? I examine the echoes and resonances between popular cultural texts such as weblogs, television and self-help books which promise to show 'families' (specifically mothers) how to 'do more with less', and recent social policy texts, speeches and publications which suture 'good parenting' to social mobility, aspiration and future success.
These 'new thrift' projects perhaps speak to a contemporary disillusionment with consumerism, but they also, as I aim to show in this paper, demonstrate the 'cruel optimism' (Berlant 2011 ) with which we continually attach ourselves to promises of future happiness via institutions and practices which diminish us. It is not my aim to show that the austere parents who author these cultural texts (or those that follow these pedagogies of austerity) have been hoodwinked by neo-liberalism, nor that they are deluded in their continuing aspirations for Studies in the Maternal, 4(2), 2012, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk the 'good life'. Instead, I aim to unpick the potency of these promises and to reflect upon the constructed and consoling nostalgias which underpin them. I aim to examine the new cultural politics of wanting in the context of austerity regimes, and to ask, what kinds of wanting are permissible or possible in this moment? What are the attachments to respectable, responsible restraint and what becomes abject in these thrift projects? I also want to excavate the gendered tyrannies of 'happiness' and happiness scripts which reinforce the new thrift movement: specifically the revitalisation of the figure of the 'happy housewife' in new thrift culture. In this sense I will examine what 'austerity' does and how it works to both orient us to an imagined future and to placate current exacerbations of experiences of inequality and hardship.
'Getting Tough' on 'Broken Britain'
The current magnetism of austerity speaks to older, and recently reinvigorated, notions of a 'social crisis': a crisis of solidarity, community and civil society. The term 'social recession' has been a popular device across the political spectrum -including the progressive left -for some time, appearing even before actual economic recession began (see Rutherford and Shah 2006; Finlayson 2010) . To understand the contemporary stitching together of parenting and austerity it is necessary to examine the emergence of the 'social recession' and the more populist (and alliterative) version of 'Broken Britain' discourses which weld together fears about 'bad' cultural choices ('lifestyle'), worklessness and social reproduction. These in turn revive notions of the 'underclass'. The term 'underclass' emerged in the United States in the 1980s and was popularized in the UK principally through the work of Charles Murray, who defined the term as referring not to a degree of poverty, but to a type of poverty (1990), a turn which contributed to popular and political reconstructions of poverty as a result of social pathologies, rather than of structural inequalities.
Murray defines the 'underclass' in terms of illegitimacy, crime and unemployment and, in later work, elaborates upon the significance of the family (and its collapse) in the transmission of behavioural deviancy, which he saw as cementing the position of the underclass across generations. His understanding of poverty is, above all, behavioural and revives late-Victorian and Edwardian moral categories of pauperism, which distinguished between the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor. This notion of the 'underclass' has come under sustained criticism by social scientists who have found his statistical analysis to be highly selective, his sociological methods unsound and evidence of a 'dependency culture' Studies in the Maternal, 4(2), 2012, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk amongst the poor and unemployed lacking (for example, Gallie 1994; Oppenheim and Harker 1996; Kempson 1996 : for an overview of this work see Lister 1996 ).
Yet despite the robust critique of Murray's work, his notion of the 'underclass' was enthusiastically incorporated by successive UK Governments, replacing 'underprivileged' -the preferred term of the 1970s -and in turn subsumed in the later 1990s by the term 'socially excluded' (Levitas 2005) . Murray himself commented on the 'ugliness' of the concept of the underclass, and others too have remarked on the ugliness it prompts in those who write about -often using the language of disease -contamination and moral hygiene (Lister 2006) . The flexibility of the term 'underclass' has made it a highly potent political tool:
indeed, re-reading Murray's original essay now I am struck by its neat synergy with current UK political rhetoric.
Underclass discourse has not suddenly 'reappeared'. Rather, it has been continually spoken and re-spoken through an ever-expanding palimpsest of categories: 'chaotic' or but what remains constant across these categories is the claim that poverty and disadvantage are a matter of choice and can be explained through the poor lifestyle choices of those who have chosen to remain at the bottom of society in the form of a static strata of pathologically and economically dependent families. As such, underclass discourse forms a key pillar in the substitution of class politics with the culturalisation of poverty (Haylett 2001; Levitas 1998) and the emergence of new vocabularies of social class which are 'bodied forth' by political fantasies of meritocracy and enthusiastically circulated in populist languages of disgust (Tyler 2004 ; see also Tyler, forthcoming).
In its current form, the rhetoric of dependency which emerges from this reinvigorated underclass discourse states that the current crisis of worklessness in the context of austerity is not a result of global recession or of diminishing job opportunities, but rather is a direct result of a munificent welfare system which has 'gone soft' and allows the unemployed to languish with no real pressures to find work. This rhetoric of dependency performs two functions: first it situates poverty as only ever a condition of worklessness, and worklessness as only ever individual failure. The myths of full employment, which are central to The 'generosity' of the welfare state is here cast as both causing worklessness, trapping the unemployed in a benefit trap, whilst at the same time, worklessness is said to be the cause of poverty. The resurgence of this doublethink dependency rhetoric in a time of recession works to re-animate moral categories around the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor, holding the undeserving as responsible not only for their own predicament, but also for that of the 'bloated' welfare state. One of the most grotesque narratives that has emerged from the current financial crisis is that the crisis has been caused not by high-risk speculative capitalism, but by those who subsist upon the public purse: not just the unemployed but also the lone parent, the disabled, and the sick.
The current austerity agenda which I interrogate here, positions the withdrawal of public services and reduction of public support from these groups as a solution to the burdens of fellowship and mutual support which (it is said) we can no longer afford. This withdrawal and reduction of social support is also positioned as the solution for the 'epidemic of the diseased will': 3 in short, the discourse of dependency actively frames the current crisis as one where personal responsibility has been undermined by state pampering, where, as Tom Slater suggests, 'big government' has 'broken' Britain (Slater forthcoming).
'Personal responsibility' is absolutely key to understanding how the financial crisis is being discursively circulated on multiple levels as an individual (not collective) failure. The individual family's 'failure' to be responsible for itself is cast here as a sickness of dependency, for which the remedy is austerity. Just as the late Victorians considered 'fecklessness' to be a marker of Slater is rightly scathing in his attack on the agnotology of the thinktank industry and the part they have played in popularising myths of the feckless and irresponsible underclass. 'Broken Britain' dependency rhetoric around work and worklessness is of consequence here because of the readiness with which it is already attached to childrearing practices and to the field of parenting, newly understood as a set of skills and competencies rather than a personal relationship (Furedi 2008) . 'Good parenting' has been identified, first
by New Labour and now by the Coalition, as the central means by which stagnant social mobility is to be invigorated and social inclusion guaranteed. The success or failure of children to perform well academically, get into university, maintain relationships and become
Studies in the Maternal, 4(2), 2012, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk employed is increasingly attributed to the style of parenting they received over and above all other factors. Similarly, 'poor parents' are seen to be reproducing the moral inadequacies of their own childhoods. The stitching of individual parental behaviour to more and more future 'outcomes' has resulted in policy targeting earlier periods of childhood in the name of social renewal. Couched in the language of efficiency, we are told that a pound spent in a child's first year (principally spent teaching its parents how to be responsible 'good parents' via parent pedagogy programmes and services) will save many more of the pounds that the child will (inevitably) cost the social purse of the future.
There are three main consequences of the 'good parenting' policy model that I want to draw out here. First, this model circulates a deficit model of working-class parenting and recasts social inequality as an individual failure to live well (Gewirtz 2005) . The 'cycles' theory of poor parenting powerfully echoes that of worklessness and dependency and contributes to the caricature of the 'underclass' which is so central to the notion of Britain being 'broken'.
Multi-generational worklessness/poor parenting explanations are deeply regressive and reproduce a classed 'Other' who has nothing to offer and everything to learn (Walkerdine and Lucey 1989). The 'good parent' that is referenced in these debates is silently but resolutely middle-class -privileged and resourced -but these (classed, material) advantages are obscured in policy which speaks of 'good parenting' as a matter of culture and aspiration.
'Good parenting' thus forms a key pillar in fantasies of meritocracy (Gillies 2005) even in the face of powerful sociological evidence which documents the impact of economic and material (classed) constraints on family practices (Lareau 2001; Gillies 2007) . The only (tantalisingly brief) references to social class appear as an apology to those who seem to effortlessly fulfil the tenets of good parenting: 'Much of what we say here may not immediately appear relevant to middle class readers, whose children imbibe effective social behaviour unconsciously with their mother's milk' (Allen and Smith 2008, p.21) .
Second, the fix on 'poor parenting' in these current debates around disadvantage illustrates how far policy has moved away from structural explanations of inequality, and towards behavioural explanations which focus on conduct and skills . The explanatory power that is attached to individual family's 'good parenting' has intensified since the economic downturn, particularly through an extended discourse of 'tough love': the elusive, correct balance of discipline and warmth which is said to guarantee educational and social successes. Tough love names the crisis of social immobility as one of parental indulgence, failure to set boundaries, moral laxity and disciplinary incompetence. As a familial solution to
Studies in the Maternal, 4(2), 2012, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk social problems, 'tough love' emerged from US intervention treatments for addictive and compulsive behaviours, and is based on recognising destructive/co-dependent love which 'rescues' and enables such behaviours to continue. It is a significant contribution to the established field of emotional interventions, knowledge and pedagogies which aim to transform the social world through appealing to us to change the way we emotionally relate to it, in this case through the way that we love our children. In order to set them up for future success, proponents of tough love insist that we must love children differently: we must say 'no', set boundaries, teach them resilience and build their characters. This 'good parenting' policy direction is pivotal to the growth of 'emotional capitalism' (Illouz 2007) , which puts the transformation of emotional life and of our relationships to others at the centre of the public sphere and questions of social equity and renewal (see also Hochschild 2003 Hochschild , 2012 Furedi 2003 Furedi , 2005 .
The eruption of the how-to-live self-help movement -which has swollen further in the contemporary moment of austerity -can be viewed as a cultural extension of social policy individualisations of poverty and disadvantage, which promise to demonstrate how you can transform yourself, your feelings, orientations and practices in order to get rich, be happy, raise confident children and so on. Self-help is one cultural expression of the 'post-social' welfare landscape. At the sharp end, emotional capitalism substitutes anger at social justice into a resolve to live better; a resolve that has become the tyranny of positive thinking and happiness science (Ehrenreich 2009). Happiness science and happiness scripts have become particularly established in the thrift and frugality culture which is the subject of this article, and I return to the connections between them in more detail in subsequent sections.
Thirdly and finally, it is important to note how 'tough love' is sutured to promises of 'social mobility'. Social mobility is a privileged object in neoliberal government, serving as a proxy for social justice. Social mobility is articulated as a matter of 'equality of opportunity', equal chances, rather than equal treatment or equal shares: as such it pronounces that we must have more aspiration rather than more redistribution. There is much robust evidence that social mobility has stalled and that social immobility links to social inequality (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Dorling 2011) . However, political commitment to 'mobility' (but not 'equality') remains. The Coalition government attaches 'fairness' to the former but not the latter. While
Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg claims to be 'appalled' by social immobility 5 , he is appalled only by the lack of movement between rich and poor, not by the gap between rich and poor itself. In naming the source of his outrage as social mobility (but not inequality), Clegg draws In the context of a national austerity agenda which disproportionately impacts the poor, and socially stagnant mobility which means that family wealth remains the biggest predictor of educational success, this rhetorical fix on 'mobility' over 'equality', 'poor parenting' over poverty, and teaching 'tough love' whilst enacting fiscal 'toughening' is revealing. I want to conclude this section by reflecting on how mobility-over-equality discourses and the call to 'tough love' both work to animate fantasies of the future and the past, and to anchor the present as a space of 'responsibility crisis' that bridges the two.
The moral annotations around today's 'problem families' in public, political and academic debates, work by constructing a fantasy family of the past. As in the production of a broad range of 'modern' problems, a 'golden age' of the family is set up as that from which we are understood to have retreated (see Coontz 2000) . 'miracle cure' with the etymological root 'to thrive', defining it as a set of habits that can fortify the individual against the toxic culture of the modern world, including 'shameful wastefulness, growing economic inequality, independence-killing indebtedness, runaway mindless consumerism'. Again, the explanation for 'poverty' offered here has nothing to do with low pay, the stagnation of wages in real terms, poor education and health provision, structural unemployment or underemployment, the effects of global neo-liberalism, deregulation of social security, reforms to welfare which aggravate class fractures (and so on).
Rather, 'poverty' is seen as a result of the failure to prudently use one's resources and is connected to moral conduct and responsibility.
The cultural turn towards 'new thrift' practices and habits repositions thrift not as a matter of survival, but as a matter of transforming the relationship of the self to itself. New thrift presents a new cultural politics of wanting, whereby to want, to desire, is marked as vulgar, irresponsible and a sign of excessive attachments to the material world. New thrift culture repeatedly states that these orientations to the material world -its acquisition and possession -and the desire for the 'good life' has weakened our moral resilience and our ability to defer our pleasures until we can pay for them. Austerity is presented not only as Nunn argues that this kind of programming is 'retrogressive' in the sense that it reproduces the dominant models of self-improvement/overcoming faulty lifestyle which it ostensibly tries to escape (Nunn 2011, p.176) .
The retrogression of austerity chic culture interpolates the consumer of today through post-war nostalgia, situating the past as a time of self-sufficiency, pride and ingenuity, to which we must return. Channel 4's Superscrimpers, now in its third series, explicitly foregrounds the post-war period that it sentimentalises in the first few minutes of each episode. The opening credits overlay portraits of members of the 'army of superscrimpers'/austerity experts with phrases of thrift wisdom ('a stitch in time', 'money doesn't grow on trees'). These credits are immediately followed with archived black and white footage of housewives seeking a bargain in exchange for ration cards while a clipped Scottish voiceover offers a deeply affective explanation:
For The wider context of austerity chic, far from marking the end of consumer distinction, demonstrates the degree to which austerity has itself become an opportunity to showcase one's consumer competence and thus cultural value. At the extreme end, austerity chic has seen the Ripe Food Movement, dumpster diving, and 'freeganism', which have been received ambivalently at best and often with a degree of unease, embarrassment or even disgust. At the softer end, however, there are many examples of milder romanticisations around austerity -the rising popularity of activities now seen as 'retro' like knitting, crocheting and crafting:
but also how to use up leftovers, how to forage for food, how to grow your own vegetables, how to reduce your heating bills, how to shop strategically, how to shop around, how to source vintage goods in your local charity shops. These practices and habits were once, and remain, a central part of the hidden labour of living on the breadline and even of workingclass pleasure. And yet in 'new thrift' culture, these practices are transformed by these lifestyle texts into aesthetic pleasures and art-forms. As such the 'new thrift' has become/is becoming a site where classed Others are produced and symbolically shamed for not being austere enough: those who do not re-use, recycle, upcycle, who are wasteful, who pay full price for the new consumer goods they want but do not 'need' and so on. The cultural politics of thrift is certainly about taste and taste cultures: yet its concerns are also broader than taste. 'New Studies in the Maternal, 4(2), 2012, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk thrift' culture produces and circulates fantasies of the classed Others against whom austerity is positioned as necessary, and who need to re-learn the lessons of frugality.
The echoes of 'Broken Britain' rhetoric are stitched through 'new thrift' culture, which insists that fiscal crisis and insecurity is a consequence of spendthrift habits, consumer incompetence, and a broader cultural forgetting of the tricks of the breadline. One such example of where romanticisations of past austerity are explicitly connected to contemporary crisis is the enthusiastic adoption of 'rationing' on thrift weblogs. The website Rationing
Revisited, whose author sets herself the challenge of feeding her family of five on Wartime rations, claims that a return to rationing is not only viable for the modern family, but is also a way to save money, get healthy and (along with other 'drastic downsizing') be happy. The author of a related weblog, The 1940s Experiment, is currently living on Wartime rations for a year in order to lose weight: she also hosts a frugal living weblog. These weblogs are scattered with vintage Wartime propaganda posters which extol the virtues of the kitchen garden, the allotment, vegetables, 'making do and mending', keeping calm and carrying on, and so on: the combination of vintage imagery and rationing chronicles working to eulogise frugal shopping and cooking. The daily humiliations of rationing -the drudgery of visiting multiple shops every day for basic goods that were not available, the repetitive and often poor-quality ingredients, the petty oppressions of shopkeepers and bureaucrats -are entirely ignored in new thrift texts such as these, which re-write rationing as an entirely beneficial solution to contemporary over-consumption, irresponsibility and wastefulness. Historian social mobility -a better life than that of your parents -then we can see how embracing thrift practices, even 'new thrift', might pinch at the self in uncomfortable ways which need to be defended against. This ironic distancing and pre-emptive use of such hostile terms signal the countercultural power of frugality tropes, as well as gesturing to the labour of resisting consumerism. By knowingly adopting these terms, thrift authors and pedagogues endeavour to create new forms of 'tightwad pride', an affective expression which is deeply classed in this context: taking pride in being 'cheap' is surely only possible when it is experienced as an option one has chosen, not a necessity. Pride, and its affective twin of shame (Munt 2007) are the powerful affective outcomes of these emerging discourses of thrift and frugality. These complexly affective and ambivalent figurations connect specifically to cultural fantasies of the enterprising and responsible family. In this final section I attend to the question of the family more closely and examine how thrift, and particularly the promise of happiness contained within it, connect the mothers and children of frugal families in troubling and even retrogressive ways.
Thrift, 'Happy Housewives' and the Happy Child
I believe staying at home has made me a much better person and has been the greatest thing I've done with my life. However, it has been stressful on us financially, causing tension in our marriage […] I have great pride in what we are doing... I just think it's annoying (and a little pathetic) when I hear people say, 'We just can't afford to have a parent at home.' It's not a matter of affording it, but about changing one's priorities and lifestyle, and about being brave. Children need us-it is so apparent in our youth today.
Jenny, quoted in Welcome Home by Cathy Myers
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The articulations of thriftiness and frugality as pleasurable are deeply gendered, interpolating the housewife mother as the solution to the family's consumer waste and fiscal incontinence.
Sara Ahmed (2010) classed. These scripts are, in the main, written by women for women, and thus interpolate a post-feminist, autonomous feminine subject whose pleasure comes not merely in her ability to consume, but in her ability to consume wisely, or even perhaps her ability to take pleasure in not consuming at all. and stay-at-home mothers. Happiness science has been drawn on to report that working mothers are happier than their stay-at-home counterparts (Mendes, Saad and McGeeney 2012 ) and equally to demonstrate that stay at home mothers are happier than their working counterparts, provided that their husbands are 'emotionally engaged' (Wilcox and Nock 2006 ). Ahmed's case does not rest on whether it is 'really' staying at home or working that makes mothers happy, but rather that unhappiness is constantly and discursively connected to feminism, such that 'it is feminism that gives women the desires that have made them unhappy ' (2010, p.53) . In the happiness paradigm, it is not the social, economic and material costs of motherhood (the motherhood penalty, patchy and unaffordable childcare, incompatibilities between unpaid care and paid labour (see Gattrell 2005) , shrinking welfare benefits for lone parents, a lack of well-paid flexible work and so on) which create maternal Studies in the Maternal, 4(2), 2012, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk unhappiness, but the failure of mothers to fully and selflessly embrace, and willingly retreat, into happy housewifery.
In the 'tough' economic climate the social advances around gender equality as they pertain to parenting (and specifically motherhood) have been among the first to come under political attack and we can already see how they are being eroded in, for example, the reduction of tax credits for working parents, including elements which contribute to childcare, such as a shortening of the time which lone parents will receive an income which recognises their childcare responsibilities and the removal of universal child benefits for higher earners. to an employment economy which would require that she spend much of her wage on buying food she could grow, paying for a commute she could avoid and childcare she could do herself, and so on. Having 'done the math' she outlines in her book the rationale for reclaiming homemaking as an educated, feminist woman, stating that 'the key to success isn't in how much money you make, but how much money you don't have to spend' (2010 p.11).
Hayes' book is interesting because of the ways that it defines, manages and defers aspirations for a better life and world through the family. The generational and intergenerational strivings and failings that result in classed formations and systems of privilege are bypassed in the somewhat romantic portrait she offers of a reconfigured future which secures happy childhood, 'authentic' living and the health of the planet. The retreat from the 'extractive economy' which Hayes and her husband successfully manoeuvre for themselves is absolutely reliant on the family farm of her parents; the emerging 'new thrift' publishing market she is able to exploit in her writing career is dependent upon their college educations and the accumulation of knowledge and resources which (despite the claims to frugality) put them in the third highest quintile of US incomes. Hayes' manifesto for radicalism thus requires a great deal of unexamined privilege.
All of these thrift texts 'explain' contemporary unhappiness with the misdirection of energy and resources towards material accumulation, and rest on the fantasy that having less/domestic retreat will improve your life. 'Thrift' rests on the fallacy that it is overconsumption which creates debt, unhappiness and the estrangement of parents from their children. This is a misattribution: for many economically crunched families the issue is not over-consumption, but stagnating wages, insecure and precarious underemployment, rising Spelman are in these comments redefining 'austerity' not as a dismantling of public services and assistance, but as virtuous household fiscal habits. In this paper I have outlined how thrift is not simply a matter of taste, but rather mobilises a new cultural politics of wanting which obscure the structural immobility of contemporary life and circulate a cruel optimism about the future: if you can just spend less and more wisely, you will move out of debt, survive and thrive, and become happy. Thrift texts produce a classed Other against whom austerity is positioned as necessary. These configurations of thrift are powerfully gendered, cementing in the gendered fantasies of the happy housewife.
We might ask whether this really is an 'age of austerity' (which we have recently moved into and will presumably move out of, eventually) or whether this 'age' is in fact a continuation of neo-liberalism which emerged in the 1970s in confrontations with organised labour and in a context of inflation. The objectives of 'austerity' align neatly with those of neo-liberalism: to discipline labour, to reduce the role of state and to redistribute income, wealth and power from labour to capital. We might therefore interpret this current turn to, or Studies in the Maternal, 4(2), 2012, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk age of, 'austerity' as the most recent translation of neoliberal rhetoric which has a much longer history than the current crisis and which has 'proved flexible and opportunistic in supplying arguments' and which has been 'quite principled and unwavering in its objectives and instruments' (McBride and Whiteside 2011).
The 2008-2009 UK recession officially lasted for five financial quarters, making it the longest and deepest since the 1930s. The economic recovery appears fragile even now. Unlike the shallower and shorter previous recession periods (1980-81 and 1990-91) this economic recovery looks set to be slower and more precarious: in 2012 the UK officially entered a second phase of recession. While the financial politics of austerity appear to be failing, the cultural politics remain powerful. We need to understand how these cultural politics take hold of us psychically as well as socially: in this paper I have sketched out a preliminary map for connecting tough love, parenting, discipline and financial continence through the consoling nostalgias of the thrifty, happy and responsible housewife. Austerity is not on the retreat:
most of the dismantling of public services and the cuts to welfare benefits are yet to come.
We need to extend our examinations of the current austerity 'moment' as a crisis of the present which in fact has long roots and the potential to seed far into the future.
